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2 
Recognising and solving a problem becomes remarkably easier when it shpws up 
wearing a peculiar foreign costume. 
- Kart N. Llewellyn -
I. Introduction 
The matter of this survey is the so-called dis~ppointed-beneficiary cases. In these 
cases an intended beneficiary of a will suffer:s a toss, because the will is rendered 
invalid due to legal malpractice of the will,:.preparing lawyer. There ·are several 
. difficult problems ,'contained in these cases/ The problems shall be examined by 
ie comparing the solutions for these cases under English and under German law. 
-
As will be seen below, poticy-considera\ions ,form the core of the leading court-
decisions dealing with that problem in England as well as in Germany because no 
satisfactory theoretical solution to the problem is been found yet. But in both 
jurisdictions it seems that the courts and writers concerned with these cases seem to 
tend to the ··opinion that the policy reasons are speaking for a solution in which the 
lawyer is held liable to the disappointed beneficiary. Since the theoretical problems 
are still not solved, these policy arguments are of crucial importance in the 
disappointed-beneficiary cases. Next to a sur:vey of the conceptual issues it shall 
therefore be tried to examine these policy_arguments carefully. 
The fairly complicated conceptual problems are mainly concerned with the question 
.,,.,,1 whether a claim should be in contract or in delict. Particularly interesting in this 
regard is that a claim against the lawyer is allowed under both of the jurisdictions, 
but whilst in English law the claim is a delictual one, on the other hand the German 
law took the contractual way. This makes a comparative survey particularly 
interesting. 
In England, just recently, the House of Lords was concerned with this problem in 
White v Jones1• It was a close three to two decision which shows how contentious 
the issue is. The majority-judges allowed the claim in tort. The decision has found 
some attention in the English legal world since it has not only an impact in· the 
confined area of the disappointed-beneficiary situation. It is likely to have 
1 All E.R. [1995] 1 691. 
3 
repercussions for the tort of negligence as a whole. Together with Henderson v. 
Merett it shows a more relaxed approach in allowing recovery for economic loss 
under the tort of negligence. This development will be portrayed in mored detail in 
the course of this survey. 
The German Supreme Court has decided a case like White v. Jones about thirty 
· years ago. It will be examined to what extent it is still valid. To do so requires that the 
German law-institutes 'Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter' or 'contract with 
protective effects vis-a-vis third parties'2 and the 'Drittschadensliquidation~ will be 
portrayed. These have gained some influence in the discussion about the cqncerned 
cases in ;the · English legal world. They were even discussed in the mentioned 
decision bt White v Jones, but eventually rejected as not suitable for the peculiarities 
1119 of English law. The question will be discussed whether these institutions provide at 
least a proper solution against the German legal background. 
Finally thEi survey will be completed with a comparison of the situation under English 
and German law. 
2 
translation from Markesinis, German Tort Law, at p.56. 
~ .... 1&Eai!:!!Zi.,,:;tit:7 -- -- -
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II. English law 
1. Legal background to White v Jones 
a) Broader developments in the tort of negligence . 
'7 -
In the disappointed-beneficiary cases one is dealing with so-called pure economic 
' ;: ,. .'· 
losses3. Here the plaintiff suffers neither personal harm nor is there any damage to 
t. / . 
his property. The legacy which the testator intends to give' to the plaintiff has' · never 
i•' 
become part of the plaintiff's assets since the will containing ·was never validated. 
Thus the losses suffered by the disappointed beneficiary are mere expectations or 
more precisely spes successionis, and therefore pure economic loss. These losses 
are recoverable under a contractual claim but, in principle, they are not recoverable 
in tort as far as negligence is concerned4. From this prindple there is an exception 
arising out of Hedley Byrne v Heller but this exception is only applicable, if certain 
conditions are fulfilled. Accordingly there has to be a 'special relationship' between 
plaintiff and defendant and 'reasonable reliance' on the defendant's side. The 
... 
. ,:., Hedley Byrne -exception is basically concerned with negligent misstatements, 
although the exact scope of Hedley Byrne is rather unclear6• It was especially 
uncertain whether this case opened the door for recovery ol economic loss, not only 
in the field of misstatements but also for other acts or omissions. Such an 
interpretation seemed to be possible, especially after Junior Books Ud. v Veitchi Co. 
Ltd7. At the same time, Lord Wilberforce developed his two-step approach in 
determining a duty of care in Anns v Merton L.B.C.8• According to this approach, a 
duty of care arises, first when there is sufficient proximity between the wrongdoer 
,' 
and the victim, and secondly, when there are no reasons against establishing such a 
,. 
duty9. This is a wideranging approach to establish a duty and, together with a broad 
interpretation of Hedley Byrne v Heller, it would have extended liability for pure 
3 see in general Bernstein Economic Loss esp. at p. 95-127. 
4 Howarth Textbook on Tort p. 267; Stapleton Duty of Care at p. 249. 
5 [1964] A. C. 465. 
6 see for this and the following Stanton The Modern Law of Tort at p.337-9. 
7 [1983] 1 A. C. 520. 





economic loss considerably. The Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi Co. Ltd. was a kind of 
summit in this development as it could be interpreted as a decision that generally 
allows recovery of pure economic loss in those cases where there existed a 
relationship of very close proximity between the plaintiff and the defendant10. But 
during the eighties in series of cases11 the courts again denied liability for economic 
loss in a negligent context, and returned to the old 'exclusionary rule'12 
However, Anns was later o,1erruled by Murphy v Brentwood District Counci/1 3. 
Accbr'ding to this decision a recovery for pure economic loss only seems possible 
based on the Hedley Byrne-principle, understood as requiring a special relationship 
between the tortfeasor and the victim and it is clear that it applies tofneither acts nor 
omissions. 
· b) Stipulatio in alteri 
Simce the possibilities to recover such a loss in tort are rather confined, it may be 
preferable to fashion such a claim in contract. However, some other peculiarities of 
the English law have to .be taken into account. In the disappointed-beneficiary 
situation, there is contract between the testator and the lawyer, the defendant. At the 
same time there are hardly ever contractual relations between the, disappointed 
beneficiary, the plaintiff, and the lawyer. Given this, the question arises as to what 
extent a person, who is not party to a certain contract, may sue on the basis of an 
act which constitutes a breach of that contract. This is a typical problem in Common 
Law where the principle of consideration applies. In other words a- promise gains 
legal recognition only if the promiser is promised something in return 14. Particularly 
English courts hold on to this principle rigidly15. Because of the strict adherence to 
that doctrine, a valid contract in favour of a third party is not possible under English 
lawi (no stipulatio alteri or jus quaesitum tertio). This impairs or ev~n prevents the 
possibility to recover in the disappointed-beneficiary situation und~r a contractual 
claim. 
10
stanton The Modem Law of Tort at p.337. 
11
Balsamo v. Medici (1984) 1 WLR at p.951; Muirhead v. Industrial Tank Specialities Ud. (1986) QB at 
p.507; Simaan General Contracting Co. v. Pilkington Glass Ud. (1988) QB at p.758. 
12
Hutchison Murphy's Law at p.16. 
13 [1991) A. C. 398. 
14 
Dias/Markesinis English Law on Torts at p.50. 
15 
Dias/Markesinis, foe cit .. 
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c) Privity of contract 
Since there is, on the other hand, a contract, viz. between lhe testator and the 
lawyer, another peculiarity of English law has to be considered. This is the privity of 
contract rule. The privity of contract doctrine has a l_ong history the content of which 
still remains somewhat unclear16. In an old case Winterbottom v Wright17 a rule was 
established, that a plaintiff who was a third party to a contract could not make a 
claim in tort, that is, a claim based on an independent tort duty·; if the conduct of the 
~ . k 
defendant identified as tortious also constituted a breach of the contract18. The 
..... ~, 
reason for this would appear to be that the third party should not be allowed to have 
more rights than the contracting parties themselves. If this approach would be taken 
literally, it would yield some strange results. It therefore seems possible for the .. 
.., contracting parties to curb the rights of an outside of the contract standing third 
party. This would be, at least in the second line, a contract with encumbering effects 
towards a third party. This rather hardlinig approach which was later addressed as 
the 'privity-fallacy', has been relaxed in the course of time, especially in the famous 
Donoghue v Stevenson case 19, where a claim in tort for a third party was allowed. 
':1 ":f 
The situation in England at the moment is therefore that it is not possible for 
contracting parties to confer benefits' towards a third party. In this regard the 
situation in England is different from the situation under most of the continental 
european jurisdictions. But like everywhere else in Europe it is not possible to 
impose duties on third parties. 
But the meaning of the privity rule has remained still somewhat vague even today. 
There have been recent decisions where it was handled pretty rigidly as in Tai Hing 
Ltd. v Liu Chong Hing BanK0 when Lord Scarman noted that: '[T]heir Lordships do 
not, however, accept that the parties, mutual obligations in tort can be any greater 
than those to be found expressly or by necessary implication in their contract'21 . In 
this view the contract has absolute priority. Another interpretation rather looks at the 
privity-doctrine as an inconsistency-principle where a tort claim will be denied if it 
leads to a circumvention of the contract. This will only apply if the circumvention is 
16 Howarth Textbook on Tort at p.214-22; Stapleton Duty of Care at p.249-52·. 
17 (1842) 10 M.&W. 109; 152 E.R. 402. 
18 Stapleton Duty of Care at p.250. 
19 (1932} A. C. 562. 
20 [1986} A. C. 80 at p. 107. 
21 at p.107G. 
~ -~·_/. '. 
;-..·, -~ .. 
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unacceptable and this provides further relaxation from the rigidity of the privity-
doctrine. Such an approach is, as will be shown below, adopted by the House of 
Lords in White v Jones. 
d) History of disappointed-beneficiary cases in England and other 
jurisdictions 
The first common-law country allowing a claim ·of the disappointed beneficiary 
against the negligent lawyer was the United States of America. This was in a case 
before the CaliforniarfSupreme Court called Biakanja v lrving22 where the claim was ' 
allowed in tort. This is today legal practice in most American States, apart from 'New 
r r 
York where the courts, as in England, continue strictly to apply privity of contract. A 
-- first case of this kind in a Commonwealth state, was decided in Canada, in 
Whittingham v Cr~ase & Co. 23where the court allowed the claim in tort on the basi~ 
.... ..., 
of the Hedley Byrne-principle. 0 
' In England, a disappointed beneficiary-situation was first decided in Ross v 
Caunters24 in 1980, where Sir Robert Megarry V-C determined the duty of care owed 
by the lawyer to the intended beneficiary by following the two-stage theory of Lord 
Wilberforce from Anns'
1 
;• Merton L.B.C 25. With regard to the problem of pure 
economic loss he held that Hedley Byrne is not seen as limiting possibility to recover 
economic loss to cases of negligent misstatements. This merely clarifies that there is 
no general rule against recovery of such a loss. On these grounds, he allowed the 
claim against the lawyer in tort. This decision was generally welcomed in the United 
Kingdom26, but there was also criticism of the extension of Donoghue v Stevenson 
(via Anns) to cases dealing with pure economic loss27• Nevertheless, the situation 
changed when Murphy v Brentwood was decided, as from then on again a special 
relationship based on the Hedley Byrne-principle was required for recovery of pure 
economic loss. The qi.Jestion therefore arose whether Ross v. Caunters is still good 
law or overruled by Murphy. 
22 
49 Cal 2d 647, 320 P 2d 16, 65 ALR2d 1358 (1958). 
23 
f1978) 88 DLR (3d) 353. 
24 
[1980] 1 Ch 297. 
25 
At 309F-31 0A 
26 
See e.g. Can~ Negligent Solicitors and Disappointed Beneficiaries. 
27 
See e.g. Kaye The Liability of Solicitors in Tort at p.683. 
-.... 
8 
In Australia, the Supreme Court of Victoria in Seale v. Perr/8 refused to follow Ross 
v. Caunters, and departed from the decision of the Supreme Court of We~tern 
Australia in Watts v. Public Trustee for Western Australia~9. Ross v. Caunters was 
also rejected by Lord Weir in Weir v. J.M. Hodge & Son30 
• Against the described background the House of Lords was concerned with a 
disappointed ber1eficiary-case in 1995 in White v Jones. 
2. White v. Jones 
'9 
\l 
a) The facts of the case 
In White v Jones, the testator, who had quarrelled with the plaintiffs, his two 
daughters, executed a will cutting them out of his estate. After he had reconciled with 
his daughters, he sent a new will to his solicitors giving them instructions to rewrite 
the old on~. Accordingly, the plaintiffs were to receive gifts of£ 9,000 each. When 
. e 
the solicitors got the letter, they remained inactive for almost two months. Meanwhile 
the testator died before the new dispositions to the plaintiffs were put into effect. 
t'. t ... 
The plaintiffs brought an action against the solicitors for damages for negligence, but 
this was dismissed on the grounds that the solicitor owed no duty of care to the 
"1 
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs then appealed to the Court of Appeal, which allowed the 
claim and held that the plaintiffs were entitled to damages of £ 9,000 each. The 
appeal of the solicitors to the House of Lords was dismissed by a three-to-two 
decision. 
b)· The judgments 
Lord Goff31 : 
Lord Goff gave the leading judgments of the majority of judges who dismissed the 
appeal and held the solicitor liable to the disappointed beneficiary. 
28 
[1982} V.R. 193. 
29 
[1980} W.A.R. 97. 
30 
1990 S.L.T. 266. 
31 At p.2528. 
.... 
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After giving the facts and describing the judgments of the courts below, Lord Goff 
proceeded with an observation of the ex~1eriences in other countries, notably in the 
Anglo-Saxon legal world. He then described what he regards as the 'conceptual 
difficulties' involved in this case. First, he stated that a solicitor acting on behalf of 
his client owes a duty of care only to his client, a duty of care that is concurrenty in 
tort and in contract32. On-the other hand the solicitors owes in general a duty of care 
in tort to a third party while discharging liis--duties to his client. In the disappointed-
beneficiary sitaalion he does not owe such a duty in contract either as there is fto 
contract between himself and the disappointed beneficiary. Due to the doctrir,~e of 
privity ~of contract'. and the doctrine of consideration, there is no ius quaesitum lertio 
under Englisfl law which might al:!ow a claim under contract between the testator and 
-. the solicitor. 
-
Secondly/Lord Goff stressed that the loss concerned is purely economic which is in 
tort of negligence, only recoverable under the Hedley Byrne -principle which requires 
assumption of responsibility. Moreover the loss of the disappointed beneficiary is a 
mere expectation, a spes succesionis that failed to come to fruition. Such losses are 
usually ruled by a contractual regime. Thirdly, Lord Goff raised the problem of 
establishing reasonable bounds if recovery is allowed in cases like Ross v. 
Caunters. He mentioned two objections against liability in the disappointed-
beneficiary situation but these have, from his point of view, no substance. , The 
testator owes the plaintiff no duty and therefore, logically, such a duty cannot be 
imposed on the solicitor. Furthermore he immediately rejected the well-known 
argument that to allow a claim against the solicitor would effectivly increase the size 
of the estate, which already has been transferred to the beneficiary under the old 
will. Finally, he emphasised that in the case before the House of Lords they are 
dealing with ah omission of the solicitor and, as a general rule, there is no liability in 
tortious negligence for omissions. , 
Lord Goff then considered Robertson v. Fleming33, where Lord Campbell contended 
that a solicitor's liability in the disappointed-beneficiary cases 'can hardly be the law 
of any country where jurisprudence has been cultivated as a science'. Lord Goff 
immediately rejected this as an authority for the present case because it is far more 
32Lord Goff is citing Midland Bank Trust Co. Ltd. v Hett, Stubbs & Kemp [1979] Ch.384 and 
Henderson v. Merrettt Syndicates Ltd. [1995] 2 AC 145 here. 
33(1861} 4 Macq. 167. 
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than a hundred years old and the mentioned statements do not form part of the ratio 
decidendi of Robertson v. Fleming. 
Under the headline 'the impulse to do practical justice', Lord Goff proceeded with the 
policy reasons which he deems to be relevant in this case and which are, from his 
point of view, clearly demanding the solicitor's liability. He began by stating that the 
only person with a valid claim, the testator, has suffered no loss, and the only person 
· wl1o~ has suffered a loss, the disappointed beneficiary, has no valid claim. This 
creates a lacuna in the law which needs to:· be filled. Moreover, Lord Goff 
emphasised the importance of legacies. Since the solicitor has negligently caused a 
loss he deems it being unjust if the solicitor goes scot-free. Finally, he mentioned the 
reliance of the public in solicitors' ability- and diligence in preparing an effective will. 
~ 
.., Lord Goff then discussed Ross v. Caunters. In this case, Sir Robert Megarry V-C 
-... 
established liability of the solicitor by direct application of Donoghue v. Stevenson 
via the two-step test developed by Lord Wilberforce in Anns. He observed that some 
difficulties in the present case have not, or only briefly, been addressed by Sir 
Robert Megarry V-C such as the spes successionis -issue and the question if the 
claim has to be fashioned in tort or in contract. 
Lord Goff later surveyed the German approach to the matter. He described the 
institute of a 'Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter' ( contract with protective 
effect for third parties) which was invoked by the German Supreme Court in BGH 
NJW 1965 at p.195534. This is a case similar to the Ross v. Caunters and the White 
v. Jones decisions. However, he deemed this doctrine as 'extending the law of 
contract beyond orthodox contractual principles'. Furthermore, he mentioned another 
German law institute, the so-called 'Drittschadensliquidation', which-was developed 
to deal with cases of transferred loss. In England, in shipping law, solutions for the 
transferred loss-issue have been achieved and these resemble the German 
approach quite closely. Lord Goff contended that the disappointed-beneficiary 
situation is very similar to the transferred-loss but there are certain distinctions which 
call for an independent solution of the former issue. 
Eventually Lord Goff rejected any contractual solution to the problem as this would 
conflict with the longstanding doctrines of consideration and privity of contract. The 
present case does not seem appropriate to reconsider these fundamental principles. 
34
which is actually not correct as will be shown below. 
-
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Finally, Lord Goff introduced his tortious solution to the problem. He stated that the 
Hedley Byrne -principle cannot be ap,plied to the problem because under normal 
circumstances there is no assumption of responsibility by the solicitor towards the 
intended beneficiary. Since, on the other hand, practical justice demands liability of 
the lawyer, there is a lacuna in the law which needs to be filled. He therefore 
\·suggested that the House of Lords 'should in ~ses such as these extend to the 
intended beneficiary a remedy under the Hedley Byrne principle by holding that the 
assumption:-of responsibility by the solicitor towards his client should be held in law 
to extend to the intended b~neficiary. The beneficiary who (as the solicitor can 
reasonabl½ foresee) may, as a result of the solicitor's negligence, be deprivE/d of, his 
intended legacy in circumstar::ices in which neither the testator nor his estate will 
have a remedy against the solictor should be given a remedy in tort35'. This solution 
is deerined by Lord Goff to do practical justice and does not cause serious 
conceptual, problems. 
Lord Mustill36: 
From Lord M,ustill comes the leading dissenting judgment allowing the appeal. He 
began explaining why, from his point of view, practical justice is not demanding 
liability of th1a will-preparing lawyer. He stated that there is no duty of care owed to 
the disappointed beneficiary neither in tort nor in contract in respect of the solicitor's 
work for the testator. This is because there is no contract between the lawyer and 
the intended beneficiary. In tort, the lawyer does not owe a duty of care to the extent 
that it would cover damage like this. Since there is no duty of care, Lord Mustill 
deemed the notion of 'fault' here either tautologuous or inaccurate, as legal fault 
does not exist in a vacuum but must be related to a legal right of the person who 
complains. rfe met the argument that the negligent solicitor would otherwise go scot-
free with the notion that 'this must depend on the rules of his profession and the 
rigour with which they are enforced. The purpose of the courts, when recognising 
tortious acts and their conseqences, is to compensate those plaintiffs who suffer 
actionable breaches of duty, not to act as second-line disciplinary tribunals imposing 
35 at p.279B. 
36276G-292E. 
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punishment in the shape of damages'37. Lord Mustill proceeded addressing the real 
rbot of the issue; the rule of the law of succession which provides that the 
dispositions of the testator will only come into effect when contained in a valid will. 
This he saw as the crucial cause of why the intended beneficiaries· expectations 
become frustrated. Moreover he stressed that the benefits have to be conferred by 
the testator, not by the solicitor, who only assists the testator in doing so. 
l:'.ord Mustill then posed the question of whether a claim could sustain in contract 
{ ,. ' ,, 
anyhow. As no claim was brought before court in contract this question is merely 
•· hypothetical. He asked whether the testator could be regarded as the agent of the 
; 1 
intended beneficiary. The testator acts to conclude a contract between the solicitor 
and the beneficiary but rejects this assumption immediately as this would not comply .... 
.., with the intentions of the parties involved. The possibility of an auxiliary promise 
-
from the solicitor to the beneficiary 1s ruied out by mentioned doctrines which inhibit 
a jus quaesitum tertio in English law. Lord Mustill continued scrutinising the other 
conceivable route of a contractual claim via the estate. In this case, the claim the 
- testator undoubtfully had against the negligent solicitor during his lifetime would be 
enforced by the estate. However, such a claim not only would have an strange look, 
there is another serious problem. The claim the testator had against the solicitor 
would be merely for the delay. He would be compensated only for the inconvinience 
and expense resulting from the failure to draft the will in appropriate time. The 
content of this claim is quite different from what the disappointed beneficiary claims, 
viz. estate or parts of the estate intended by the testator to be transferred to him via 
the new but non-valid will. Lord Mustill then conluded that there is no contractual 
remedy available in the disappointed-beneficiary cases. 
Lord Mustill now considered whether the claim could succeed in tort. He started with 
Ross v. Caunters, but observed that this judgment was based on the two-step test 
yielded by Lord Wilberforce in Anns v.1 Merton London Borough Council. Since the 
decision was overruled by Murphy v. Brentwood D.C., the whole situation has to be 
reconsidered. He then took Hedley Byrne as a· starting point and contended that in 
that case there are notably four issues: (1) mutuality; (2) special relationship; (3) 
reliance and (4) undertaking of responsibility. Lord Mustill continued with a thorough 
survey of these issues. He concluded that in the cases of disappointed-beneficiary 
37278C. 
13 
there is no special rel~tionship and no 'mutualitiy', the latter being the essence of the 
Hedley Byrne-decision
38
. From h;is judgment it appears that Lord Mustill understood 
'mutuality' ~s contact of any kind between the plaintiff and the defendant. He 
~ 
therefore considered Hedley Byrne to be too different to include the disappointed-
beneficiary situation under its umbrella. Finally, he su:'eyed whether Donoghue v. 
Stevenson provides a solution for the p~esent case. He first admitted that this 
decision cannot give rise dir-ec~ly-to a duty in the concerned cases. However, it 
ft 
open~ dp the possibility of inferring a new duty in new types of specialffelation~hips 
that ~re .remote from the,.,_one in Donoghue v. Stevenson itself39. Finally, Lord Mustill 
,. resppnded to this question negatively because such a duty., would? apply to any 
situation where A promi.~es B a reward to perform a service for B, in,.circumstances 
where ,it is foreseeable that performance of the service with care. will cause C to 
receive a benefit, and that failure to perform it may cause C n9t to receive that 
benefit'40 . This would mean a substantial extension of the area of p~tential liability 
which is not justified by any principled reasoning. 
In other words Lord Mustill did not acknowledge the possibility for such a claim in 
tort, and he therefore allowed the appeal of the solicitor. 
The other Judgments in White v. Jones: 
t. 
Lord Keith of Kinkel agreed with Lord Mustill and also allowed the appeal of the 
solicitors 41. He pointed out that the disappointed beneficiarie, s claim. presupposes 
that the solicitor owed them exactly the same duty in tort as he owed in contract to 
the testator. However, such a duty could not be owed them in contract due to the 
ban of a jus quaesitum tertio in English law and Lord Keith doubted that the law 
could,- recognise circumvention of this rule in tort. Hedley Byrn~
1 
as well as 
Henperson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. 42 were not deemed as apt auth~rities since, in 
' I 
the/ present case, there is no direct relationship between the inten~ed beneficiary 
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Lord Browne-Wikinson dismissed the appeal. In his view a duty of care arises from 
an extension of the principle of assumption of responsibility as explored in Hedley 
Byrne. This is achieved by drawing an analogy as in Caparo Industries Pie. v. 
Dickman43. By examining Nocton v. Lord Ashburton44 on the one hand and Hedley 
Byrne and Henderson v. Merrett on the other, Lord Browne-Wilkinson mentioned two 
categories ·of special relationships out of which a duty of care, arises, ( 1) where there 
is a fiduciary relationship and (2) where the defepdant has voluntarily answered a 
question or tenders skille.d advice or services in circumstances where he knows, or 
ought to know, that an !identified plaintiff v/211 rely on his answers'45. He admitted that 
the present case falls( into, neither category but, because a close analogy can be f 
drawn, it should be· appropriate to op~n up a new category where a special 
..., relationship should· be deemed to be present. Finally, Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
....,.... 
demonstrated why,' in his view, it is also fair, just and reasonable to impose liability 0 
on the negligent solicitor. 
Lord Nolan completed the judgments and also.,dismissed the appeal46. According to 
him simple justice demands that the disappointed beneficiary is able to recover his 
frustrated expectations , from the solicitor who has assumed responsibility by 
undertaking a task which is potentially harmful. tn Lord Nolan· s view, a professional 
man or an artisan who agrees to exercise his skill in a manner which, to his 
knowledge, may cause loss to others, if carelessly performed, may thereby implicitly 
assume a legal responsibility towards them'47 . 
c) Analysis of the de.cision 
The judgments in White v. Jones are scrutinised below, with particular regard to the 
legal background described above. 
43 
(1990] 2 A.C. at p. 605 
44
[1914} A.C. at p.932. 
45at p.274F. 
46at p.292F. 
47 at p.294A. 
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(1) Economic loss 
As far as the issue of pure economic loss is concerned it has to be observed that this r 
case, together with Henderson v. Merrett, is one of the few occasions where courts 
in England have allowed recovery on the basis of tort of negligence outside the field 
of negligent misstatements48. There was, however, disagreement among the judges 
and it was a close three to two decision. 
Lord Keith disagreed on°this matter as he regards Hedley Byrne as being a narrow l' ·· 
exception from the principle that pure economic loss is mot recoverable. This 
i .• , exception is ctependent on reliance and a direct relationship creating suffieient 
.... -
---
proximity. Both he deemed this as not being given here and ·he therefore found 
himself unable to allow the claim in tort. Furthermore, he emphasised that the loss is 
a mere expectation, only existent in the mind of the testator, and even if were to 
have legal effect it would only become a mere 'spes successionis of an ambulatory 
character'. 
Lord Goff dismissed the appeal, allowing recovery for this pure economic loss. His c 
first point was that he deemed recovery possible in cases of 'assumption of 
~:esponsibility' under the principle in Hedley Byrne. He also, admitted that mere 
'-
expectations fall in the exclusive domain of contractual law. After a rather 
perfunctory survey of Hedley Byrne v. Heller, compared with the thorough 
examinations of Lord Browne-Wilkinson and especially of Lord Mustill, Lord Goff 
came to the conclusion that the normal disappointed-beneficiary case does not fit 
into the Hedley Byrne-principle. But he maintained that the House should, in such 
cases, extend to the intended beneficiary a remedy under the Hedley Byrne principle 
by holding that the assumption of responsibility by the solicitor towards his client 
" should be held in law to extend to the intended beneficiary:i.9. In his approach, to 
.:: extend the assumption of responsibility in law, Lord Goff seems to differ from the 
other majority judgments of Lord Browne-Wilkinson50 and Lord Nolan51 , which 
convey the impression that they regard the assumption as being real52 . For Lord 
48see Whittaker Future Directions at p.193. 
49at p.2680. 
50at p.2748. 
51 at p.293H. 
52see s. Whittaker Future Directions at p.192 and his criticism of Lord Gaffs concept of an 
assumption of responsibility extended in law at p.205. 
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Goff, such an assumption of responsibility is merely a deemed while the other judges 
regard it as actual. His result he deemed being justified by all the policiy reasons he 
mentioned before. Lord Goff then pointed out that the objection to unlimited liability 
does not.apply since liability, in the present case, is owed only to the disappointed 
beneficiaries in respect of a particular will53. In this instance, Lord Mustill expressed 
a completely opposite view. He considered it impossible to draw a reasonable 
,, · boundary between cases like this and those cases where A r:>romises B for reward to 
perform a service for 8, in circumstances where it is foreseeable that performance of 
. ' 
the service with care will cause C to receive a benefit, and that failure to perform it 
may cause C not to receive that 'benefit'54. 
_.. Lord Browne-Wilkinson also doubted that the case can be placed under the Hedley 
Byrne-principle as reliance will often be missing in cases like this. On the other 
hand, his Lordship held that the disappointed-beneficiary cases can and should 
have a remedy rendered by an analogy to the Hedley Byrne-principle, the method of 
drawing an analogy to be approved by Caparo Industries Pie. v. Dickmann55. The 
analogy he based on the assumption that there are two kinds of special relationships 
discovered yet where a duty of care ·exists, that is the fiduciary relationship on the 
one hand (traced back by him to Nocton v. Lord Ashburton56); and on the other hand 
a situation 'where the defendant has voluntarily answered a question or tenders 
skilled advice or services in circumstances where he knows or ought to know that an 
identified plaintiff will rely on his answers'57(the Hedley Byrne -situation). A common 
feature in both these situations, in Lord Browne-Wilkinson, s belief, is the voluntary 
assumption of the defendant to act in the plaintiff's affairs. Such an assumption he 
also found in the disappointed-beneficiary cases as well and due to the awareness 
of the solicitor that the economic:well-being of the intended beneficiary depends on 
the proper discharge of his duties. Lord Browne-Wilkinson proposed to include the 
disappointed-beneficiary cases' under the Hedley Byrne-principle by the way of 
analogy. 
53
cf. to this matter Howarth Textbook on Tort at p.285-6. 
54at p291D. 
55 
(1990} 2 A.C. at p.605. 
56(1914} A. C. at p.932. 
57at p.274F. 
17 
Lord Mustill showed a much narrower approach to the exception to the general rule 
contained in Hedley Byrne that pure economic loss is not recoverable under the tort .. 
of neglig~nce than the other Lordships apart from Lord Keith. ~ccording to Lord 
Mustill a somehow mutual relationship is a basic feature of the Hedley Byrne-case 
. ~ ! 
which cannot be found in the disappointed-beneficiary cases. He therefore rejected 
any application of the Hedley Byrne-principle. For him only Donoghu~ v. Stevenson 
offered a possible fourdation for such a claim because it '[o]pened up the possibility c- -
of inferring a quite new duty in new types of special relati~m.ships far distant from 
~ 0 
i those which existed in Donoghue v. Stevenson itself58 . But, in his view, such a 
·, ;; solution is ruled out since it would extend the §.rea of liability for negligence 
considerably·rand this is not justified by any principled re?soning in cases s4ch as 
----_. White v. Jones. 
--
Lord Nolan, s approach seems to be similar to what was ;igtated by Lord Browne-
Wilkinson in his judgment. The will-preparing solicitor has assumed responsibility by 
venturing on a potentially harmful activity with regard to third parties. A duty of care 
1~ 
therefore arises towards the third party and by the breach of it the solicitor may 
•., ·. become liable. 
Economic loss is a very difficult issue and therefore almost ipevitably contentious59. 
·, 
White v. Jones was deemed to be auspicious that it would take the problem closer to 
a solution before it was released60• It is doubtful whether White v. Jones can meet 
these expectations. It was a split decision and even the majority judges, voting for 
liability of the will-pre,paring solicitor appeared to confine the scope of their decision .. 
to the special situation of the disappointed-beneficiary cases61 . However, what may 
t be stated is that White v. Jones did prove that economic lo$s is recoverable under 
.r the tort of negligence also if any reliance of the plaintiff m?Iy be missing62 . Further 
impact of the decision in this regard seem to be hardly foreseeable. 
58 at p.290F. 
59
Atiyah Negligence and Economic Loss at p.248; Howarth Textbook on Tort at p.285-6; Hutchison 
Murphy's Law at p.3; Markesinis Expanding Tort Law at p.354. 
61 
Rogers Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort preface at p. V. 
52see L~rd Nolan at p.293O; Lord Goff at p.269E; Lord Browne-Wilkinson at p.2768. 
Hutchrson Murphy's Law at p.33. In general rejecting the concept of 'reliance' Stapleton in Duty of 




(2) The doctrines of privity of contract and no jus quaesitum tertio 
The doctrines of privity of contract and no jus quaesitum tertio complicate the task of 
1' 1/ 
drawing a reasonable boundary between contract law and the tort of negligence in 
English law. Here both doctrines are treated together since the first is, according to 
Lord Goff, 'considered to exclude the recognition of a jus quaesitum tertio'63 . 
1.., 
For Lord Keith, it seems,, this is the main obstacle allowing a claim against the 
solicitor. Because of this doctrine, he considered a contractual solution to the matter 
! 
to be ruled out, a view he shared with all the other judges. Since, for him, a tortious 
claim against the lawyer would mean de facto a clear circumvention of this principle, 
,, 
he rejected such an approach as well. Lord Goff, against it, did not see an 
unacceptable circumvention of this principle here64but he failed to say why 
circumvention in this case is acceptable65. Lord Browne--Wilkinson did not address 
the problem, so it seems that the circumvention-argument evidently has not 
. ·.~ ' 1.•~ 
appealed to him either. Lord Mustill mentioned the 'no jus quaesitum tertio' just 
briefly, when examining the possibility of claiming against the solicitor in contract. He 
then did exclude the possibility of a claim in contract with, the mere notion of the 
doctrine, but he admitted that English law may be inching towards the direct 
enforcement of contracts, or benefits intended to be conferred under them, by 
persons standing outside ,:the mutual obligations created by the bargain'66. When he 
scrutinised the possibility of a tortious solution, Lord Mustill mentioned the issue 
f t 
again so it may be concluded that he has a rather relaxed attitude to it. Lord Nolan, 
meanwhile, was only concerned with the matter vicariously by discussing the 
63 at p.266D. 
64 at p.268F. 
65 
see Howarth Textbook on Tort at p.286. 
66 at p.281C. 
--
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concurrence of contractual and tortious duties. He stated that Henderson v. Merrett 
has shown that the contractual duty to the partner in contract can coexist with a duty 
of care in tort to a third party. As regards the relationship between these duties, he 
contended that the existence and terms of the contract may be relevant in 
determining what the law of tort may reasonably require of the defendant in all the 
circumstances'137. 
As mentioned above, the meaning of the doctrine of rprivity is still somewhat unclear 
and an attempt should be made to describe possible meanings and find similarities 
with the judgments in White v. Jones. 
( 1) The first conceivable meaning is that the existence of a contract excludes any 
independent claim of a third party in tort when the damage-causing conduct 
constitutes a breach of that contract. This is what is known as the 'privily fallacy' and· 
be been abandoned in English law since Donoghue Ii. Stevenson. It is certainly a 
strange approach, It means far more than excluding .a contract in favour of a third 
party, a rule that still forms part of the contemporary English law up to a certain, or 
rather uncertain, grade. This rigid approach, however, to allows exactly the opposite: 
that is to conclude contracts with the effect of depriving third parties of rights they 
might have had without the contract - in this case a claim against a perpetrator in 
tort. 
(2) Another restricted view of the privity of contract-doctrine is based on a distinction 
of the loss that is suffered. If the loss consists of personal injury or physical damage, 
there is no problem in recovering it in tort provided that the requirements are fullfilled 
(no matter if the loss is caused by a breach of contract which distinguishes this 
67 at p.294G. 
-.....,,,,,,, 
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approach from (1)). If the loss against it is economic then recovery in principle is 
excluded apart from very narrow exceptions under the Hedley Byme-p~inciple. This 
appears to be the view of Lord Keith. He considered a claim of the disappointed 
beneficiaries to be ruled out because their claim in tort is for exactly what was owed . -
by the solicitor to--the testator in contract68. Lord Keith did not say, however, if in such 
a case a tortious ~laim remains possible for whatever reason. 
·'" ' .. 
(3) A third approach would exclud~ a tortious claim if such a claim were inconsistent 
with expresse¢ or implied terms of the contract. Thi~, view was adopted in Tai fling 
Ud. v Uu Chong Hing Bank. 
(4) A further view could be considered to be opposite Lord Keith's approach that a 
circumvention :of the privity of contract-rule, as understood in (2), is possible when 
such a circumvention is acceptable because there are reasons justifying it. It seems 
that Lord Goff has used such an approach in his judgment. He deemed a contractual 
solution to the disappointed-beneficiary cases as an illegitimate circumvention of the p; 
privity of contract-principle69. On the other hand he then granted the intended 
beneficiaries in tort what they would have received if the solicitor had discharged his 
contractual duties owed to the testator properly. In other words, the beneficiaries 
receive the same as what would have been the outcome of a contractual claim which 
he found inadequate due an account of the circumvention argument. Thus, to allow 
this claim would. also mean a circumvention of privity-rule albeit in tort. This is ¼ttat 
was complained about by Lord Keith and why he rejected the tortious route. S.ince 
Lord Goff allowed the claim, he must have found that the implied circumvention was 
acceptable in this case. Lord Goff did not give reasons why he thinks a 
68 cf. at p.251C. 
69 at p.266D. 
-
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circumvention in tort is acceptable and he was critisised for this70. Lord Mustill's 
opinion on this matter did not become clear from his judgment. However, as he did 
not reject the claim on the same grounds as Lord Keith, on the other hand claiming 
that no authorities would sustain such a claim and that to open up a new area in tort 
of negligence could not be justified in this case, it may be concluded that he would 
allow a circumvention in tort if it was 'acceptable'. He therefore shares Lord Goff's 
view;:on this matter. 
(5) A very relaxed view of the privily-rule would be if the tortious claim were only 
influenced by the contract by defining the content-of the claim. In this situation, there 
is only a tenuous connection between contractrand tort claim. Lord Nolan stated in 
his judgment: the existence and terms of the contract may be relevant in determining 
what the law of tort may reasonably require of the defendant in all the 
circumstances'71 . This may indicate that he supports the portrayed approach but it 
should be taken into account that his judgment is ·rat.Iner short so this could be 
overinterpretation. 
d) Conclusion 
What impact will White v. Jones have on the landscape of English law? This is 
difficult to predict, not only for the more general issues such as economic loss and 
the privity of contract rule, but for the disappoi~ted beneficiary situation itself, 
because two out of five judges denied any claim ag~inst the will-preparing lawyer. In 
addition Lord Mustill presented some strong arguments ag?inst it in his rather long 
and thorough judgment. His objections are not only of a conceptual nature but his 
judgment also raises certain doubts about the policy reasons which hitherto 
70 
Howarth Textbook on Tori at p.286. 
71 at p.294G. 
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dominated the discussion on the disappointed-beneficiary situation and clearly 
seemed to speak for a lawyer's liability. This will be considered in more detail later 
on when compared with the German situation. Furthermore the tortious solution 
, adopted in the majority of judgments is based mainly on policy-considerations. The 
\!, - t 
conceptual weaknesses are obvious as being admitted even by the judges approving 
\, 
it by stressing, that conceptual issues should not stand in the way of justice. There is 
~ ~ 
_,; . 
a possibility that. in future that a contractual solution will be favoured, as is already 
. ' 
suggested by many writers72. 
What can be observed is that the result of Ross v. Caunters has survived although 
the claim:of disappointed beneficiaries has a new basis now. While Sir Me~arry V-C 
based a claim in tort on Donoghue v. Stevenson through the famous but discarded 
two-step test of Lord Wilberforce from the Anns-case, the majority of the House of 
Yt 
Lords now opened a category of its own where economic loss is recoverable under 
the tort of negli·gence. It did so not by applying the Hedley Byrne-principle itself to· 
the disappointed-beneficiary cases but by drawing an analogy to this doctrine. 
That this new-founded category will be capable of encompassing other situations 
- ' 
than the disappointed-beneficiary situation seems to be unlikely because the judges 
allowing the claim stressed that they regard their findings as confined to the 
peculiarities of this special situation. On the other hand, most of the judges show a 
rather relaxect'approach towards the privity of contract-doctrine in the sense that a 
'i j 
tortious claim:"remains possible as long as a circumvention of contract is justified and 
therefore acceptable: Moreover White v. Jones proves again that reliance is not 
necessarily a prerequisite for recovery of damages when liability is based on Hedley 
Byrne. 
72
Markesinis Expanding Tort Law at p.354; Whittaker Future Directions at p.192. 
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Ill. German Law 
In Germany a case similar to White v Jones was decided by the German Supreme 
Court ('Bundesgerichtshof', BGH) in 196573. The claim of the disappointed 
beneficiary was allowed but, unlike in England, on a contractual basis. To have a 
,, .-
proper understanding of the decision, a brief introduction into the German legal 
background shall be given first. 
1. General situation 
' ... 
Unlike English law German Private Law is statutory. The core of it is the 
'Burgerliches Gesetzbuch' or BGB which came into force on January 1st 1900. Like 
most of the Continental civil codes it, is strongly influenced by the French 'code civil'. 
A legal system based on a code naturally ''has to follow different rules from a 
~-
common law system. A civil lawyer trying to find out what the law says about a 
' 
certain matter will first study his code then he will look into the commentaries 
explaining the provisions and, if his work is thorough, he will pursue the references 
to court decisions and articles on the issue. Since all the fields such as law of 
contract, law of tort, family law and law of succession are covered by not more than 
approximately 2000 paragraphs, those par~graphs have to be rather abstract. Thus 
a civil lawyer tends to think in more abstract ways, compared whith a common lawyer 
r 
who notably works with the more concrete court decisions. Due to the described 
, 
•situation, court decisions are less important in a civil law system. It is no problem for 
courts to overcome former decisions if they deem it apt to adopt a new view. If they 
73 
BGH 1965 NJW at p. 1955. 
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do so, it is not dependent on the route that the legal discourse has taken in the 
meantime. Thus writers have a strong influence in such a system. Accordingly, the 
survey of German law with regard to the disappointed-beneficiary cases will put 
more emphasis on the concepts developed by writers and rather less on the fairly 
old decision of the BGH. 
r \'. r r:-. 
2. 1 Borderline between contract and delict: Same problem the other way 
, 
arolind 
As, mentioned above, there is some criticism about the tendency in English law to 
apply tortious solutions to contractual matters in order toi circumvent the 
inconvenient doctrines of the contract law such as the privity-rule and the doctrine of 
consideration. In Germany it is the other way around. Here one finds that more and 
more contractual solutions are adopted to issues that are delictual in nature to offset 
the weakr~esses of the law of delict in the BGB74. 
The following issues are apprehended as causing the weaknesses75: §831 
Burgerliches Gesetzbuch provides that a master is not held liable for acts of his 
servant if he has certain excuses. Such excuses are rather easy to achieve and are 
not available under the law of contracts. The law of contract also provides more 
favourable rules of evidence for the person suffering loss. Unlike French law76, there 
is no, general provision for delictual liability. §823 confines liability for unintended 
harm to certain legally protected rights ('Rechtsguter') and, moreover, pure 
economic loss ('Vermogensschaden') is not recoverable under this provision. Those 
74
Lorenz Anmerkungen zur BGH-Entscheidung in 1966 JZ at p.143. 
75 
Palandt before §823 note 23 
76
For the situation in French law see Whittaker The French Experiment at p.327. 
=:..:/· "!. . _':'t,;-,;~t-"' .... ,;, • '"" -, 
-





losses which are primary economic losses are ooly recoverable under German law 
of delict if the tortfeasor has acted intentionally(§ 826). 
An attempt is to set off the mentioned weaknesses by contractual means. These 
include the 'Vertr~g mit Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter' or 'contract with protective 
effects vis-a-vis third parties'n, -- the 'Drittschadensliquidation', the 'culpa in 
•1 contrahendo' and the 'positive Fprperungs-(or Vertrags-)verletzung'. They provide 
contractual remedies for persons wt)o suffer losses.~and come away empty-handed 
under;;;the fairly rigid German la~v of delict. In the disappointed-beneficiary situation, 
the 'contract with protective effects vis-a-vis third parties' and the 
'Drittschadensliquidation' are· of particular interest. They shall be describe in more 
detail below. 
3. 'Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung zugunsten Critter' or 'contract with protective 
effects vis-a-vis third parties' 
In German law, it is possible for the contracting parties to stipulate rights in favour of 
a third party so that the third party is enabled to demand that the promisor carries 
out his promise (stipulatio alteri or jus quaesitum tertio). Such a contract is called 
'Vertrag zugunsten Dritter'78 which may be translated as a 'contract in favour of a 
third party'._ Its rules are set out in §§ 328 Burgerliches Gesetzbuch79 (German 
Civilian Code). 
This concept allowed for the development of the institute of the 'contract with 
protective effects vis-a-vis third parties'. In German law there is a distinction between 
77 
translation from Markesinis German Tort Law at p.56. 
78
see in general Lorenzen Die Einbeziehung Drifter in vertragliche Schuldverhaltnisse - Grenzen 
zwischen vertraglicher und defiktischer Haftung 1960 JZ at p.108. 
79in the following 8GB. 
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primary or main duties arising from the contract and so-called secondary duties80 .. 
. 
The primary duties are in a 'do ut des'-relation to each other. This means that a party 
agreed to such an obligation - to deliver the goods, for instance - only because the 
other party agreed to a corresponding obligation such as - if it is a normal sales-
contract - to pay the purcha~e price (this concept seems to resemble the English 
corJsideration-concept). Generally speaking, there are two main groups, of secondary 
dutie~. The first group of duties have a serving function towards the rr,ain duties81 . ::-1 
They shall ensure that the purpose of the contract will be achieved; for example the . ' 
--.. duties in a sales-contract to deliver the goods at the right time and in the right 
manner. The other group of secondary duties shall protect the rights of the partners 
in contract. These rights are largely protected by the law of delict. However, by 
concluding and performing a contract, the legally protected rights of the contracting 
-
,. 
parties are exposed in a particular way to the actions of the respective partner. It is 
the func;:tion of the secondary duties to set off these special dangers. lt)s normally 
possible to sue for the fulfilment of a secondary duty when the duty is breached. In 
this case, the claim is not for fulfilment of the duty (as the purpose of the duty is to 
avoid a breach which cannot be made undone) but sounds in money for recovery of 
the damages caused by the breach. 
In the statutory ruled 'contract in favour of a third party', the third party acquires the 
right to claim the primary or main duty of the contract, for instance t~ demand that 
t ~ ;, :, 
thy seller delivers the goods to him and not to the promisee. On the.,:other hand, in a 
'contract with protective effects vis-a-vis third parties', the third party has no·right to 
the primary duty of the contract. Thus, in the sales-contract example, he cannot 
80
Medicus in Munchner Kommentar zum 8GB before §242 note 24-32. 
81




with protective effects vis-a-vis third parties' there is no increase in risks. Whilst in a 
'contract with proteqtive effects vis-a-vis third parties' the creditor owes a contractual i-. 
~ duty of care, not only to his contracting partner, but also to the intrnded beneficiary 
of the protective effects. Here there is only one risk for which he will be held liable 
for and which is transferred. Another characteristic feature of the 
~ 
'Drittschadensliquidation' is an.accidental shift of the loss ('zufallige ,, 
Schadensverlagen.Jr,tg'.). 
~"- ~ ' 
5. The disappointed-beneficiary situation under Gerrrian'law 
ft 
The various approaches adopted by writers and the BGH of the disappointed-
(] t! ., 
beneficiary issue will be portrayed, as follows: 




Kegel seeks a solution to the problem in the law of succession. His basic idea is to 
,'l • ;.; 
regard the old but valid will as unvalid and replace it with the new but invalid will due 
to negligence of the will-preparing lawyer. The beneficiari~s under the old will 
i t. 
therefore only receive what is granted to them under the new will and the intended 
beneficiaries of the new are treated as if the new but ill-prepared will was valid. The 
J,i 
reason for this solution becomes readily recognisable from ·the title of Kegel, s article: 
Lachende Doppelerben which may be loosely translated. as 'happy double heirs'. 
Kegel argues that the assets of the family as a whole increase if the old will remains 
valid and the new will is carried out effectively due to the recovery from the negligent 
lawyer87. This he' deems as unjustified because in the disappointed-beneficiary 
cases the true intentions of the testator are known. It is just a question of giving them 
?J 
•' 
way instead of carrying out the old will which is known 1as not to be the will of the 
testator when he deceased. Technically, Kegel achieve~ the result as follows88: he 
argues that the German law of succession knows of certain situations where an 
actually valid will will be disregarded. For the above mentioned reasons he then 
draws an analogy to these cases. 
87 Kegel at p.554. 
88Kegel at p.556 
.... 
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b) Reinhard Zimmermann (Lachende Doppelerben? - Erbfolge und 
Schadensersatz bei Anwaltsverschulden in Familienrechtszeitung 1980 at 
p.99) 
Zimmermann takes a critical view of Kegels approach and offers a different solution 
to the problem. He deems the · above described solution as not practicable since 
there is no room for such an analogy drawn by Kegel. Such an analogy is only 
possible if there is a lacuna in the law. However, there is a positive rule demanding 
that a valid will must be followed. The· statutory exceptions of this rule are very 
confined and 'therefore not capable of an analogy89. For Zimmermann, there is no 
claim of the disappo'inted beneficiary at all. The 'contract with protective effects vis-
..., a-vis third parties' is ruled out because there is no special relationship beween the 
testator as the creditor of the contractual obligation and the disappointed beneficiary 
as the third party9°. ·Since there is no accidential shift of loss, the loss could only ·1 
occur for the intended beneficiary, neither 'Drittschadensliquidation' does help91 . A 
delictual solution is impossible because none, of the legally protected rights of §823 I 
BGB is impaired and, moreover, this provision does not compensate for pure 
economic losses92. Zimmermann believes the disappointed beneficiary to be in such 
a weak position lies with the rigid law of succession and because there are certain 
good reasons for its rigidity, he deems the result to be justified93 . 
...._ c) Werner Lorenz (Anmerkung zu BGH Juristen Zeitung 1966 at p.143) - In his critique of the BGH-decision Lorenz agrees with the court with regard to the 
result but he did not share the conceptual route that was adopted by the BGH. He 
proposes offering the beneficiary the status of a party of the contract between 
testator and solicitor94. He justifies his view with the observation that the claim of the 
disappointed benefidary is an attempt to gain what was the content of the contract, 
89Zi mmermann at p.101. 
90Zi mmermann at p.99. 
91Zi mmermann at p.100. 
92Zi, mmermann at p.99. 93z• 1mmermann at p.101. 





not merely damages for the breach of certain secondary duties95. Thus the 'contract 
with protective ~ffects vis-a-vis third parties' is the wrong remedy96. 
d) The German Supreme Court - BGH NJW 1965 at p.1955 
The facts which underlie the decision of the BGH in 1965 were very similar to the 
~ facts in White v Jones. A solicitor was asked to draft a will for the· testator and for the 
validity of the wHl,·it was necessary to consult a notary. The solicitor failed to consult 
' such a notary within a reasonable time during which the· testator died. The intended 
beneficiaries of the new will now sued the solicitor :for their losses. The plaintiffs 
succeeded before all courts. 
The BGH, as well as the court of appeal, denied· a 'Vertrag zugunsten Dritter' 
('contract in favour of a third party') like it is provided by § 328 8GB. But while the 
court of appeal applied the concept of a 'contract with protective effects vis-a-vis 
third parties' in this case, the BGH expressly left open the question of the 
correctness of this reasoning, which is often overlooked when this decision is 
referred to~7,:· However, it stated that the lawyer, in any case, owed the plaintiff a 
contractual duty of care under the principle of good faith. This is because of the 
close family-connection between the contractual partner cf the lawyer, the testator, 
. 
and the plaintiff8. Furthermore, the lawyer's performance of the contract was 
especially intended to serve the plaintiff's interests, which was clearly foreseeable 
for the defendant99• The BGH rejected the objection of the defendant that the loss of 
-- the plaintiff is merely an expectation, not a damage in a legal sense 100. 
6. Conclusion 
It is not that easy to judge the situation in Germany sfnce the BGH-decision is more 
than 30 years old and the issue is no longer in thei focus of attention of the legal 
discourse in Germany. The task becomes even more complicated with the approach 
95Lorenz lac.cit. 
96
see above at??? it only remedies breaches of secondary duties. 
97 at p.1956. Therefore it is not correct, if Lord Goff contends that the BGH had invoked the 'contract 
with protective effects vis-a-vis third parties' in this case. 
98 atp.1957. 
99 at loc. cit .. 






of the BGH not to adopt one of the several institutes to remedy the disappointed-
beneficiary situation but rather to base the clair:n on the good-faith principle. The 
conceptual approach of the 
I 
court seems to be a bit strange in its decision. Court 
contended that it must not decide whether the 'contract with protective effects vis-a-
vis third parties' should be applied to the situation 101 . Instead, it is maintained that 
t ; ,, 
there in any case would be a duty of care arising from the good-faith concept. This is 
strange because this concept is rather unclear a9d, in the event of it being applied, 
much effort is usually'.i ~pent on arguing if and why a claim may be based on it. 
Furthermore, it is a ~to~cept which is ~pplied subsidiary - this means it is only 
. ; ~ 
available if other bas€!s for the claim are not applicable. But the court, more or less, 
I 
merely states that the good-faith principl1 has to be applied . 
Thus, the decision is more or less founded on pure policy-consideration rather than, 
orthodox legal reasoning. However, policy ideas within a society are subject to 
change during the course of time. This is well illustrated by what Lord Campbell said ., 
in Robertson v. Fleming in 1861, viz. that to allow a claim against the will-preparing 
lawyer by the disappointed beneficiary could __ 9ardly be the law of any country where 
jurisprudence has been cultivated as a science. 
Whether one of the other theories which were introduced above will ever succeed is 1 ; r. ~ (:. 
subject to speculation. It should be mentioned that the BGH later adopted Kegel' s 
thought of the 'happy double heirs'102 but the case was markedly different from the 
disappointed-beneficiary situation. In studying the solutions offered to the problem 
under law, it is conspicious that no one suggested the application of the 
'Drittschadensliquidation' although it was sometimes part of the considerations 103. 
There are mainly two features in the disappointed-:beneficiary cases which prevent a 
' 
solution under the 'Drittschadensliquidation'. Firstly there is no accidential shift of 
' . 
the loss since the loss 9ould from the outset only occur for the intended beneficiary. 
' Secondly the lawyer has to face an increase in risks. Not only does he has a duty of 
care towards his client, the testator, but also, if he is held liable to the intended 
beneficiary, he owes a duty of care to him. Thus the 'Drittschadensliquidation' can 
101Lorenz in Anmerkungen zur BGH-Entscheidung JZ ?1966? at p.143 calls this 'unbefridigend' 
~unsatisfactory). 
02BGH in NJW 1979 at p.2033. 
103 cf. BGH at p.1957; Lorenz at p.144. 
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not be applied in the concerned cases and does not provide help for the 
disappointed beneficiary 104. 
In this regard, the 'contract with protective effects vis-a-vis third parties' is often 
considered an insecure option because of the conceptual problems involved. There 
are doubts emerge from the question as is whether there is a special relationship 
between the creditor of the performance of the contract, the testator, and the third 
party, that i~ the disappointed beneficiary. Meanwhile in most of these cases ihere is 
' . 
a strong personal relationship between them, mostly even'a family relation. But this 
i .. . 
depends on the nature of the draft of a will. From this point of view, an ordinary 
sales-contract concluded by one member 'of the family would have protective effects 
towards the rest of the family, or even to clos~ friends of the buyer, if the other 
conditions are fulfilled105. Another problem is that the clusters of cases where the 
'contract with protective effects vis-a-vis third parties' were applied, were those 
where the duty in question was a duty of conduct. This is a secondary duty. But in 
these cases it is dealt with a primary or main duty, viz. the duty to prepare a proper 
will, which is not complied with properly or, as in this case, and in White v Jones, the 
duty is not fulfilled within a reasonable time106. Furthermore, the institute was, until 
then, never applied to economic loss107. For these reasons, a solution under the 
institute of 'contracts with protective effects vis-a-vis third parties' seems rather 
inappropriate. 
In summary one may say that the situation under German law may be even less 
clear than in English law. There is hardly any discussion about these cases in 
Germany, at the moment, but it is to be hoped that when attention is again focused 
on it in Germany that the discourse may benefit from what is now being said in the 
course of the White v. Jones case in England and the academic reflection about it. 
104
other opinion is uttered by S.S. Markesinis An Expanding Tort Law - The Price of a Rigid Contract 
Law LQR ?1987? at p.368 where he deems this institute as being most appropriate to the 
disappointed-beneficiary situation. 
:: This point is raised by Zimmermann at p. 99. 
at p. 1957. 
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A comparison between the solutions adopted under English and German law are of 
particular attraction as it should be borne in mind that the supreme courts have 
presented the same results but with opposite conceptual approaches, as the House 
of Lords allowed the claim in tort and the BGH against it allowed it in contract. 
A further similarity is that both courts found themselves confrionted .with conceptual 
difficulties which they could not overcome by convincing ~egal reasoning but both 
deemed their solutions to be justified by the equities of the cases. The Majority in the 
House of Lords wanted to allow the claim in tort but agreed that it could not be 
achieved simply by bringing the matter under the Hedley Byrne -principle, the case 
which they deemed as a starting point for a solution of the disappointed-beneficiary 
situation. They then drew an analogy but were confronted with the objection that 
such an analogy is inappropriate because, in the disappointed-beneficiary situation, 
there is no 'special relationship' or 'mutuality' at all, a feature which Lord Mustill 
thinks is essential in the Hedley Byrne decision. Finally, the majority of the Law 
,- ·· Lords were not concerned by such conceptual problems because they saw their 
-
mission in carrying out 'practical justice'108or 'simple justice'109. 
The BGH had a similar approach towards the issue. The court disregarded the 
conceptual problems involved by simply leaving open what construction could bring 
a result, such as the accomplished, and holding that it is justified by the principle of 
good faith in any case110. Evidently, the court was convinced that clearcut policy 
considerations speak for the liability of the lawyer. 
While the House of Lords took the route in tort, the BGH preferred the contractual 
way, depending on the peculiarities of the English and German law systems. 
Because of the rather rigid adherence to the principle of consideration, the privity-
doctrin and the no jus-quaesitum-tertio rule, there is a tendency in England to seek a 
solution in law of delict, particularly in the tort of negligence, for cases which would 
otherwise fall under the law of contract111 . In Germany it is the exact opposite. In 
108Lord Goff at p.259F. 
109Lord Nolan at p.2930. 
110BGH NJW 1965 at p.1956. 
111
see B.S. Mark.esinis An Expanding Tort Law - The Price of a Rigid Contract Law LQR ?1991? at 
p.354. 
34 
account of the already mentioned weaknesses in the law of delict, especially that 
economic loss is not recoverable unless it is caused intentionally, courts and writers 
prefer to seek solutions rather in contract. 
The choice of which law should be applied to the issue is important as this decision 
is bound to have some important repercussions 112. Looking at the law of conflicts, a 
contractual approach would be choice-orientated while a delictual solution would ask 
for the place (locus) of the commission of the tort. With regard to the kind of loss 
being purely economical contract law would be the natural basis for granting remedy 
while in tort law this :is, ,in England as well as in Germany, only possible in certain 
peculiar instances. Furthermore, in both systems, different standards of care apply, 
especially when adopting a tortious solution to the disappointed-beneficiary 
.., situation. The problem would arise in defining the content of a duty of care without 
falling back on the contract. In contract and delictual law, the limitation periods are 
also different. 
-
In the following comment is made on what is said about the nature of the 
disappointed-beneficiary situation, whether, it should be deemed contractual or 
delictual. Lord Mustill, eventually rejecting any kind of liability of the solicitor, admits 
an instinctive preference for a contractual solution'113. This estimation he shares with 
quite a lot of academic writers in England114. On the other hand, Lorenz claims that 
these cases belong to the law of delict and it is only due to the weaknesses of the 
German law of delict that courts adopt contractual solutions. In JZ 1966 at p.145 he 
dicusses the 'bemerkenswerte Tendenz des deutschen Rechts verstarkt, 
Tatbestande, die eigentlich ins Deliktsrecht gehoren, in die Vertragshaftung 
einzubeziehen' (which may be translated as 'the remarkable tendency in German 
. law to bring cases under contractual liability which indeed belong to the law of 
delict'). This estimation is precisely the opposite of his English colleagues. The 
suspicion may be aroused that, due to the conceptual problems involved in this 
case, the lawyers concerned might find a better solution in the field of law which its 
legal system is just not adopting. They could possibly benefit from experiences in 
112
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foreign countries, which might show them that they would fall out of the frying-pan 
into the fire by applying the other area of law to the cases. The English solution in 
, tort raises problems by bringing it in line with the, precedents. The adopted 
approach, viz. opening up a new category by the means of analogy, is confronted 
with the objection that it will be difficult to draw up reasonable boundaries for this 
category115. In Germany, on the other hand, the contractual solutions suffer due to 
the fact, that one has to take a very relaxed approach to the contractual institutes in 
question to solve the case with them. Whether a tortious or contractual solution is 
preferrable, and if maybe no liability at all should be the answer to the matter shall be 
surveyed in greater detail below. At the moment it is sufficient to say that the 
solutions in England as well as in Germany are not really convincing from a 
conceptual point of view. 
115see Lord Mustill at p.291C-E. 
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V. Analysis of the disappointed-beneficiary situation 
Comparison of the disappointed-beneficiary situation under English and German law 
has shown that the solutions adopted by the courts are not satisfactory in conceptual 
regards in neither of the countries. The structure of the cases will be surveyed to 
discover why they cause such theoretical difficult~es. The aim is to establish if there 
are similarities in the; structure of the disappointed-beneficiary situation and other 
cases solved respectively by the means. of the Hedley Byrne -principle in England 
and the 'contract with, protective effects vis-a-vis third parties' in Germany. 
The problems in these cases are overcome by both supreme courts on the grounds .. 
.., of policy reasons. These policy considerations are examined in a second step, to· 
-
find out whether the courts are correct in their opinion that justice demands liability 
of the solicitor towards the disappointed-beneficiary. 
1. Sructure of the cases decided on the grounds of the Hedley Byrne principle 
a) Hedley Byrne 
Comparing the structure of White v. Jones with Hedley Byrne was one of the major 
concerns of the law lords in White v. Jones itself. They all agreed that there were 
strong differences between the situations in both cases which led Lords Keith and 
Mustill to the conclusion that Hedley Byrne cannot be applied at all, while the other 
Lords drew an analogy. 
Firstly, in Hedley Byrne there was no contract between the plaintiff and the 
defendant. In the White v. Jones situation there is a contract, albeit not between 
plaintiff and defendant but between the defendant and the testator. In Hedley Byrne, 
on the other hand, there was at least a contact between plaintiff and defendant and t 
without it there could have been no claim at all. The contact is a conditio sine qua 
non for the loss suffered by the plaintiff. This differs again from the disappointed-
beneficiary cases since it might well be that there is no contact at all between the 
plaintiff and the defendant, although the plaintiff might suffer a loss. Thus the 
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b) Spring v. Guardian Assurance116 
In this decision, the plaintiff used to work for the defendant in the financial services 
industry. Following disagreements about his work , he decided to leave and work as 
an agent for another firm. However; before he could start work, the rules of the body 
regulating the industry required his old employer, the defendant, to provide a 
reference t<J the new employer. The defendant sent such a reference. h was 
damning and accused the plaintiff of dishonesty; The new employer thereupon 
refused to allow the plaintiff to start work. But it turned out that the ·reference was 
mistaken in its accusation. The plaintiff, at worst, could be accused of having taken 
on work beyond his degree of experience. At best, he was a competent employee 
whose employer was at fault in failing to give him proper support and training. In any 
case he was not dishonest. 
In a four to one decision, the House of Lords found that the old employer, the 
defendant, owed a duty of care to the plaintiff who could then recover the losses he 
suffered· due to the negligent reference. In this case, there was a contact between 
plaintiff and defendant since the plaintiff was in a working relationship with the 
defendant. On the other hand, with regard to the act causing the actual harm, viz. 
the issuing of the negligent written reference, there was no contact between plaintiff 
and defendant, as this happened only between the old and the new employer. 
Accordingly, unlike in Hedley Byrne, there could not be reliance involved on the 
.-. plaintiff side. In this regard, the case resembled the White v. Jones situation . ... 
c) Henderson v. Merett117 
In Henderson v. Merett, the plaintiffs were investors in the Lloyd's insurance market, 
known as 'names'. They were members of syndicates managed as agents by the 
defendant underwriters. The plaintiffs were either 'C!iirect names' that is the syndicate 
to which the names belonged, managed by the ·members, agents themselves, or 
'indirect names' that is the members, agents placed the names with syndicates 
managed by other agents and entered into agreements with the managing agents of 
those syndicates delegating their own responsibilities to them. The relationship 
116?1994? 3 All ER at p.129. 
117?1994? 14 PD at p.64. 
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between names, members, agents and managing agents was regulated by 
agreements which gave the agent 'absolute discretion' in respect of underwriting 
business conducted on behalf of the name but it was accepted that it was an implied 
term of the agreements that the agents would exercise due care and skill in the 
exercise of their functions as managing agents. The plaintiffs .sued the defendants 
alleging that the defendants had been negligent in the management of the 
plaintiffs, syndicates. Because they ran out of time they could not sue for the breach 
of contract anymore so they had to sue in tort. 
The House G5f Lords found for; the plaintiffs and allowed the claim agaim\'c the 
underwriters Jn tort under the Hedley Byrne principle. They allowed the claim pf the 
'direct names' as well as of the 'indirect names'. In case of the former there was a 
, direct, viz. contractual contact between the plaintiff and the defendant unlike in the 
Hedley Byrne situation where there was merely a 'special relationship'. There was 
no direct contact between the 'indirect names' and the defendants, merely a 
vicarious contact conveyed by the agents of their syndicates which concluded 
agreements on behalf of the 'indirect names' with the managing agents. Since they 
knew of the construction of the business, there was reliance involved on the 
plaintiffs' side that the defendants would act with reasonable care. 
d) Conclusion 
In examining the cases above it has become obvious that the situation in White v . 
.._ Jones is different from Hedley Byrne and other cases decided under the established .... 
principle. Unlike in Hedley Byrne, there is no necessary contact between the plaintiff 
and the defendant in White v. Jones and neither is reliance. In Henderson v. Merett 
there is at least a vicarious contact in the case of the 'indirect names' established by 
the managing agents by acting on the plaintiffs, behalf. Spring v. Guardian 
Assurance is::closer to the disappointed-beneficiary situation as there is no contact 
between the plaintiff and defendant in the moment that the loss-causing act is 
committed. Furthermore, there is no reliance on the plaintiff's side. On the other 
hand, the defendant in Spring v. Guardian Assurance is acting to discharge a duty 
emerging from the rules of the body that regulates the industry, while in White v. 




At this stage, it may be stated that the situation in White v. Jones considerably 
differs from other Hedley Byrne cases and this alone necessitates a special 
justification why liability should arise here. However, there is another point which 
makes the disappointed-beneficiary situation unique and which is, in my view, crucial 
for an evaluation of the disappointed-beneficiary cases. It stems from what has 
already been said by Lord Mustill and Zimmermann. when they contended that the 
real ire~son for the loss of the disappointed-beneficiary lies in the law of succession 
,. 
and not in the lawyer's negligence 118. Indeed; on expection of the causal chain there 
is a fundamental difference in the disappointed-beneficiary situation. In Hedley 
Byrne, the bank gives a negligent statement, the plaintiff relies on it and there is the 
loss. In Spring v. Guardian Assurance, there is the negligent reference issued; the 
third party (new employer) relies on it and the loss occurs. When the agents in 
Henderson v. Merell conclude negligently risky insurance contracts then, after the 
event of damage, the loss of the plaintiffs occurs. In White v. Jones, against it, when 
the lawyer fails to draft a proper will, or he fails to do so within a reasonable time, 
.~md the testator dies the loss also occurs. But unlike the other cited cases, this is 
only because of the certain rules of succession which favour, under both English and 
German law, a older but valid will instead of 'a newer but invalid will. It is easy to 
conceive a law of succession which would give the intended beneficiary of a newer, 
but for formal reasons, invalid will, the opportunity to prove the real intentions of the 
testator when he died, and then to overrule the valid will no longer complying with 
the testators intentions. Under such a less rigid succession-law, the negligent act of 
the will-preparing lawyer would not cause such a loss which it is now claimed for in 
the disappointed-beneficiary cases. He would just be liable for the inconvenience 
such a complicated way of inheriting would cause. 
This normative element in the chain of causation is not contained in the other 
mentioned Hedley Byrne cases. It makes White v. Jones special and poses some 
serious questions. There is the often uttered objection that to hold the lawyer liable 
to the disappointed beneficiary means circumventing the rules of the law of 
succession which favours of the beneficiary of the older but valid will. Furthermore, it 
is responsible for the odd result that, from an economical point of view, the estate of 
118Mustill at p.2780 and Zimmermann in Lachende Doppelerben? - Erbfo/ge und Schadensersatz bei 




the testator has increased, dependent on the case, it may be even doubled in size. 
Furthermore, In the chain of causation, the effect of the law of succession is closer to 
the loss than the negligent act of the lawyer. As long as the testator is still alive, the 
mistake of the lawyer can still be amended. Then the lawyer's negligence would not 
lead to a loss of the intended beneficiary at all. This indeed suggests that it is the 
law of succession rather than the lawyer's negligence which causes the loss. 
What becomes clear, in my opinion, is that there are peculiarities inherent in the 
disappointed-beneficiary cases which make them a category of their own. Whether 
there is justification for liability of the lawyer in this field shall be surveyed when I am 
dealir'ig with the policy reasons . 
2. Structure of cases decided under the institute of 'contracts, with protective 
effects vis-a-vis third parties' 
In Germany, the most common solution which favours the disappointed beneficiary 
adopts the institute of 'contracts with protective effects vis-a-vis third parties'. The 
BGH has expressly left open the question of whether the institute might be applied, 
but its j1:1dgment shows some sympathy for this approach. In the following a few 
cases will be introduced where the institute of 'contracts with protective effects vis-a-
vis third parties' is applied. The structure of the cases will then be compared with the 
disappointed-beneficiary cases to find out the extent of differences and similarities . 
In BGH NJW 1978 at p.2502 the police of a town had concluded a contract with a 
company about towing illegally parked cars. By towing such a car the company· s 
employees negligently damaged the vehicle. The BGH allowed a claim under the 
institute of 'contracts with protective effects vis-a-vis third parties'. 
BGH NJW 1976 at p.712 dealt with a mother entering a supermarket fora purchase. 
She was accompanyed by her child. The child then slipped on a lettuce leaf which 
was lying on the ground and was hurt. The BGH allowed the claim of the child 
against the supermarket on the grounds of a 'contracts with protective effects vis-a-
vis third parties'. 
The facts of BGH NJW 1982 at p.2431 were pretty complicated. For the purposes of 
this survey, they are simplified to an appropriate level. The consul of a foreign 
... 
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country approached a professional expert on real estate and asked for an evaluation 
of certain premises. The expert negligently gave a misstatement. A bank of the 
consul· s state of origin relied on that, gave a loan for a project concerning the 
mentioned premises and consequently suffered a loss. The BGH held that a contract 
was concluded between the consul and the expert and that this contract had 
'protective effects vis-a-vis third·· parties'. He deemed the foreign bank to be a third 
party which was under the protective umbrella of this contract. ., ·, 
Examining these cases, the same phenomenon can be discerned as described 
i.iJ above. In none of the cases is a normative .effect in the chain 0f causation involved 
as in the disappointed-beneficiary cases were the law of succession has a part to 
play. A further observation shows that the disappointed-benefi0iary case is the only 
one were the loss is a mere expectation: In the towing company's case, the third 
party suffered physical loss; the child in the other case suffered personal injury and 
the bank in the last case lost parts of the ~loan it had approved. Again, as in the 
English situation, it becomes pretty obvious that the disappointed-beneficiary cases 
do.not really fit in the category of other cases decided under the principles. 
3. The policy reasons involved 
It has now become apparent that there are some serious problems under both 
English law and German law which impair a conceptual sound solution in favour of 
the disappointed beneficiary. In spite of this, the supreme courts in both countries 
have decided to hold the will-preparing lawyer liable towards the disappointed 
beneficiary. They did so because of the policy reasons or 'the reasons of justice119' 
involved. Since these deliberations are the decisive factor, the validity of the policy 
reasons in the case shall be scrutinised as follows: 
a) The one-has-no-claim-one-has-no-loss issue 
One argument often heard in the disappointed-beneficiary issue is that the only 
person who could have a valid claim (the testator) has suffered no loss, and the only 
119
Lord Goff at p.259G. 
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person who has suffered a loss (the disappointed beneficiary) has no claim. From 
this it is concluded that there is a lacuna in the law
120
. 
There are two objections to this argument. The first is that it is rather a descri'ption 
than a statement containing any material justice. consideration. This is because one 
is dealing here with pure economic loss and as far as pure economic loss is 
concerned, there is always the question of wether such a loss should have a legal 
relief. This is because there are many acts which cause an economic loss to another 
one, but the act itself is based on a maxim which is socially acknowledged. This 
applies·, in particular, to a society which is based on free-market principles, where 
there are numerous actions which cause economic loss to competitors, but which are 
necessary to keep things going in a free market. The question, therefore, is not, 
whether an act ( or omission or statement) causes economic loss, but to determine if 
it is carried out in a socially inadequate way. According to that, it is not the point to 
determine if there is economic loss. On a second step it has to be asked whether the 
person suffering the loss should be protected against it by the law. In this case, of 
course, it may easily be stated that the lawyer acted inadequately socially, because 
he negligently breached his contractual obligations. But again there is the already 
mentioned consideration that contained in the chain of causation is the effect of the 
law of succession. This makes it rather doubtful that the loss suffered can be traced 
back to the lawyer's negligence in a way that sufficiently satisfies the rules of the tort 
of negligence. The one-has-no-claim-one-has-no-loss argument contributes nothing 
--. to this question. It is merely a description. A prerequesite for its application is to __, 
decide whether the suffered loss shall be recoverable. Since this is the question, the 
argument is of no value and is rather apt to disguise the real issue. 
The second objection is that the notion is normally used in so-called 'transferred 
loss' situations or in German law in context of the 'DrittschadensliqWidation'. It 
applies· to cases where the damage is shifted 'fortuitously', which mean·s that there 
must be a 'legal relationship' between the creditor and the harmed third party. Due to 
this, the damage shifts to the party that does not have its own contractual claim 
against the initial debtor121 . The shift is not due to extraneous circumstances but to 
120
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legal provisions that separate bearing the risk and ownership of a thing from each 
;, other. From this situation, it follows that the loss which is shifting remains the same 
as if it would have been when it were suffered by the contractual partner when there 
would not have been the mentioned separation. However, in the disappointed-
beneficiary situation, the loss that is suffered is completely different from what the 
testator, as the partner in contract of the will-preparing lawyer, could have suffered. 
', F:Jrhtermore,. the shift of the loss is by no means fortuitous. The claim of the 
disappointed beneficiary is different from any claim the testator ever could have 
against the lawyer. Thus, the notion of one-has-no-claim-one-has-no-loss is 
completely misleading because the :claim of the one person in this situation is for 
inconvenience suffered from the negligent preparation of the will. The loss the other • ..., person has suffered is in not achieving the intended benefits under the new ill-
prepared will. There is no relation between the claim and the loss. 
For these reasons, the one-has-no-claim-one-has-no-loss argument has carries no 
weight in the disappointed-beneficiary situation. Therefore, It.can be disregarded. 
b) Scot-free argument 
Another important argument involved is that the negligent lawyer should not go scot-
free and that it is fair, just and reasonable to impose liability on him 122. 
Lord Mustill has replied to this in a forceful manner123. He admitted that it might be 
unfair if the solictor goes scot-free although he has failed to do his job properly. 
Meanwhile, this is not a question of the law of torts but of the rules of his profession 
, and the rigour with which they are enforced. He states that the purpose of the courts 
when recognising tortious acts and their conseqences, is to compensate those 
plaintiffs who suffer actionable breaches of duty, and not to act as second-line 
disciplinary tribunals imposing punishment in the shape of damages'124. What is 
evident is that the validity of this objection depends on whether the law of delict has 







a punishment function or not, and this is not quite clear125. But at least it may be 
stated that the prime aim of tort law is compensation, not punishment. 
c) No recovery for the 'poor' disappointed-beneficiary 
There is another equity-consideration underlying the approach to a decision in 
favour of 'the disappointed beneficiary and that there must be something wrong with 
the law if the plaintiff is not relieved by an award of money. 
,, Again ·it is considered that the loss suffered by the disappointed beneficiary is 
.- actually a result of, the rigid rules of the law of succession 126. It is;argued that, without 
'i the rigid succession-law, there would be no difficulty to correct the failure of the 
lawyer by just acknowledging the new, albeit improperly-drafted, will, at least ip 
cases where the validity of the new will can be proved beyond any reasonable doubt. 
That would be in compliance with the real dispositions of the testator, the intended 
· beneficiary would be happy and there would be no question of the liability of the 
lawyer127. However, the law of succession decides otherwise under both English and 
German law and strictly acknowleges only the last wishes contained in a valid will 
complying with the formal rules. There are good reasons for this. Legal certainty 
speaks for it and that is even more convincing in a sensitive matter such as dealing 
with the last will of a deceased person, who cannot be personally asked anymore 
;about his real intentions 128. Moreover, the formal rules ensure ,that the testator is 
acting with appropriate seriousness and does not abuse the will as an instrument to 
·tame disobedient relatives, or, if he does so, he has to do so in compliance with the 
strict formal rules of the law of succession, which are likely to make him think 
twice 129. 
o 125see R.W.M. Dias & B.S. Mark.esinis Tort Law at p.1 Sff., W.V.H. Rogers Witt1field & Jolowicz on Tort 
1 at p.1f., D. Howarth Textbook on Tort at p.6ff., K.M. Stanton The Modem Lavi of Tort at p.11ff .. 
126Lord Mustill at p.278D; R. Zimmermann Lachende Doppelerben? - Erbfo/ge und Schadensersatz 
bei Anwaltsverschulden at p.1 00f., G. Kegel Die Lachenden Doppelerben: Erbfo/ge beim Versagen 
von Urkundspersonen at p.554. 
127 Notwithstanding possible contractual claims from the estate concerning the poor performance of 
the lawyer of his duties out of the contract with the testator. , 
128R. Zimmermann Lachende Doppelerben? - Erbfolge und Schadensersatz bei Anwaltsverschulden 
atp.101. 
129R. Zimmermann ibid. The seriousness, for example, might be doubted in the White v Jones case 
where the testator first quarelled with his daughters and disinherited them and then decided otherwise 
when they were reconciled. Of course the testator is free to do with his assets as he pleases, but the 
strict formal rules of the law of succession shall provide that he will consider his decisions thoroughly. 
... ..., 
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It must be admitted that this counter-argument described above is convincing, on the 
other hand, it is based on a premise which is not that sure. Basically, it explains why 
the beneficiary under the old will receives benefits and not the intended beneficiary 
under the invalid new will. It does not explain why the will-preparing lawyer should 
not be liable in tort to the disappointed-beneficiary. For this, it would be necessary to 
assume that if there is an assessment taken by one field of law (here the law of 
succession) then it should not be circumvented by another field of law (here the law 
of torts). However, this premise is by no means accepted unanimously. There are 
cases where a claim in tort is denied because it would have circumvented another 
law-field's result as in The Aliakman 1986 AC at p.785, Jones v. Department of 
Employment 1989 QB 1 or Corbett v. Burge, !Narren and Ridgley 1932 48 TLR 626 
130
. On the other hand, such circumvention was recently accepted in Spring v. 
Guardian Assurance where a tort claim was allowed, although the plaintiff could not 
succeed under the claim of defamation. 
From my point of view a circumvention should only be prohibited if the aim of the 
other field of law is to protect the defendant. In this case, the rigid rules of the law of 
succession do not include protecting a negligent will-preparing lawyer. Therefore, in 
my view, the circumvention argument is not effective in this case. 
Nevertheless, the assumption that the disappointed beneficiary should receive some 
relief in the form of money is not an argument but a result which needs to be justified 
by legal reasoning . 
d) Some other arguments 
Some other arguments are briefly described below. Lord Goff mentioned the 
importance of legacies for people 131 . This argument is surely not of crucial 
importance but it may have some supportive effect when a solution in favour of the 
disappointed beneficiary is presented. Another objection is the unlimited claims 
argument132. This is no problem provided one does not look at the persons involved 
but at the point that there is only one estate involved with what the will-preparing 
lawyer deals with. His liability is confined to the content of it and therefore there is no 
problem of unlimited claims. 
130see D. Howarth Textbook on Tort at p.287. 
131at p.2608-D. 
132
Lord Goff deals with it at p.269E. 
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VI. Conclusion 
After this close look at the disappointed-beneficiary cases what is the solution? Well, 
first, it should be stated that to hold the lawyer liable in this situation causes some 
considerable conceptual problems under English as •well as German law. In fact no 
satisfactory solution has yet been presented. In Germany two of the three academic 
writers which were referred to above denied a claim of the disappointed beneficiary 
-'against the lawyer and all three agree that the BGH-solutiorJ is not based on 
. orthodox legal reasoning. The conceptual approach of the majority judges in White v. 
i Jones, not the result, was also subject to some critisism. 
- , Basically, as a solution for the disappointed-beneficiary situation, three approaches 
were suggested. One is to allow the claim against the lawyer, either in tort or in 
contract, as it is done by the English and German supreme courts respectively. 
Another way favours the invalid but new will, instead of the old one. There is then no 
disappointed beneficiary anymore and therefore no claim against the lawyer. The 
third way is to hold on to the status quo and not allowing a claim of the disappointed 
beneficiary. 
The problem with the first way of allowing a claim against the lawyer is that there is, 
as mentioned before, no cohvincing concept of how to do so. Considering this, at 
least clear-cut reasons of justice shoul9 demand such a result. It could be hoped 
then that one is dealing with a case where the perception of justice has taken place 
faster than the understanding of it, and that a reasonable concept based on, as Lord 
Goff puts it, 'orthodox legal_ reasoning' will be developed later. However, Lord Mustill, 
in my view, successfully destroyed the impression that there are such clear-cut 
policy-reasons. I think what is fair in this case is still subject to discourse. 
1 The second way which develops a solution out of the law of succession instead of a 
-' tort law solution is the way which appeals to me mostly. This is because it is 
complies with the testator's last wishes and would create a solution. where the 
lawyer's negligence were effectively removed. On the other hand, as Reinhard 
Zimmermann has shown, such a solution lies in the hand of parliament which has to 
change the law but it is not possible for the courts to overcome the expressed will of 
the legislative assembly. 
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For these reasons I would follow Lord Mustill and those who deny liability of the 
lawyer because this is, notwithstanding further developments in the English or 
German law, the only acceptable result from a conceptual point of view. Compliance 
with the acknowledged concepts of law, in my view, bears some justice in itself, 
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